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Quantum secret sharing (QSS) schemes without entanglement have huge advantages in scalability
and are easier to realize as they only require sequential communications of a single quantum system.
However, these schemes often come with drawbacks such as exact (n, n) structure, flaws in security
and in lack of effective cheating detection, which need urgent optimizations. To address this, we
propose a verifiable framework of utilizing entanglement-free states to construct (t, n)-QSS schemes.
Our work is the first step towards perfect security in entanglement-free QSS, and it sheds light
on how to establish effective verification mechanism against cheating. As a result, the proposed
framework has a significant importance in constructing QSS schemes for versatile applications in
quantum networks due to its intrinsic scalability, flexibility and perfect security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sharing a secret among multiple users with efficiency
is a significant problem in practice. Currently several
schemes called secret sharing (SS) are proposed to attain
this gaol. An important class of secret sharing schemes is
(t, n) threshold secret sharing [(t, n)-SS] scheme proposed
by Shamir [1] and Blakely [2] independently in 1979 with
wide applications [3–8]. Two criteria should be consid-
ered in a well-defined (t, n) threshold scheme [1, 2]. The
first one is reliability, meaning the scheme should allow
given subsets of authorized users to reconstruct the se-
cret faithfully when the size of the subset is not smaller
than threshold t (access structure). However, if the size
condition is not satisfied, the users should not gain any
information about the secret (even with unlimited com-
putation recourse) and this is the second criterion, con-
fidentiality. In those schemes, classical information is
encoded by mathematical transformations, which have
been proven to be information-theoretically secure.
In classical cryptography systems, it is well known that
most classical cryptosystems employ the assumptions of
computational complexity to ensure security, but they
might be broken by the development of advanced tools
such as quantum algorithms [9, 10]. So, quantum cryp-
tography has attracted much attention due to its inherent
security, which relies on physical laws such as Heisen-
berg uncertainty principle and the resulted quantum no-
cloning theorem [11, 12]. Due to those properties, using
quantum secret sharing (QSS) to share secrets among
users is more reliable and promising. Furthermore, it also
provides a robust and secure solution to quantum state
storage and computation [13]. The first QSS scheme was
proposed by Hillery et al. [14] (HBB) in 1999, which
takes advantage of a three-qubit entangled Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state. In the scheme, a GHZ
triplet is split and each particle is delivered to a user.
Both users measure their own particles in natural basis
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and combine the results to obtain the dealer’s measure-
ment result. Following the similar idea, various (HBB-
type) QSS schemes using quantum correlations in well-
constructed entangled states are proposed [15–22]. How-
ever, these entanglement-based schemes are poor in scal-
ability because engineering entanglement among large
number of particles is unrealistic in current experiments
[23, 24]. Moreover, quantum correlations are prone to be
spoiled by weak interactions with outside environments
because of decoherence and this may lead to a wrong
result of the computation[25]. Another problem in these
schemes is that a failure measurement owing to inefficient
detection can easily render an invalid round.
Thus, QSS schemes without entanglement will be more
practical to quantum network and have also attracted a
lot of attention. For instance, in Schmid’s scheme [26], a
single qubit is used to carry the secret and participants
use phase shift operations to embed random values into
the qubit, such that the secret can be recovered later by
exchanging random numbers. In a recent work [27], the
authors show that schemes based on multi-system entan-
glement can be mapped into much simpler ones involving
only single system, which is a useful method to reduce
complexity of entanglement QSS. In the same year, V.
Karimipour et al. [28] further optimize the method and
improve the efficiency from 1/d to 1/2. Such schemes
only require sequential communication of a single quan-
tum state and thus, have significant advantages in scal-
ability and make proof-of-concept experiments feasible.
However, they are all (n, n) structure which are not au-
thentic threshold secret sharing in nature because they
require all n shareholders to participate in secret recov-
ering. Besides, most of them have been shown to be vul-
nerable to attacks. For example, Schmid’s scheme will no
longer be secure if someone adopts the attack proposed in
[29]; Karimipour’s scheme is also not secure because any
one dishonest participant can recover the secret with-
out the aid of other participants [30]. Moreover, their
schemes need a trusted third party (e.g. the dealer) in
secret reconstruction, who is appointed to measure the
processed quantum states; such a cheat is not under con-
sideration in their schemes that a participant can publish
fake random numbers in secret reconstruction, as a result
2the participant can recover the true secret only himself
while others cannot.
In this paper, we propose a general framework of ver-
ifiable entanglement-free (t, n)-QSS schemes and present
a concrete implementation. Moreover, schemes con-
structed under the verifiable framework have the follow-
ing 3 properties which can address the drawbacks in pre-
vious works.
(i) Scalability. These schemes only require sequen-
tial communication of a single quantum system, i.e.,
each participant performs their own unitary opera-
tions sequentially on a quantum state. As a result,
entanglement-free states make these schemes scalable
with growing participants.
(ii) Threshold structure. One can encode the secrets
and corresponding shares generated in classical (t, n)-SS
into phases of quantum states and this provides a class of
(t, n)-QSS for different applications in the sense that clas-
sical ones may be generated by versatile methods such as
interpolation polynomial [1], linear code [31, 32], geomet-
ric structure [2], Chinese Remainder Theorem [33, 34],
etc. Such schemes satisfy both reliability and confiden-
tiality conditions for (t, n) structure and are perfect in
security based on classical (t, n)-SS.
(iii) Verification mechanism. The last participant (se-
quential order) measures the final state and this frees the
requirement of trusted third-parties. Thanks to the aux-
iliary particle, cheat of any participant (including the last
one) and eavesdropping can be detected by verifying the
consistency of the recovered results.
After diagnosis this general framework, we use Quan-
tum Fourier transformation (QFT) and generalized Pauli
operation to construct a d-level QSS as a concrete im-
plementation. First, the dealer generates n shares from
a secret and allocates each share to shareholders as in a
proper classical (t, n)-SS. Then at least t participants per-
form generalized Pauli operations (in some order) sequen-
tially on a processed state. Subsequently, the last partic-
ipant performs Inverse QFT (IQFT) and then measures
the quantum state in computational basis. At last, these
participants exchange private random numbers embed-
ded into the qudit such that they can recover the dealer’s
secret independently from measurement results. Eaves-
dropping and cheat can be detected at the final step.
For the purpose of illustration, we use Shamir’s scheme
as the proper classical SS to show our entanglement-free
(t, n)-QSS step by step.
II. FRAMEWORK OF ENTANGLEMENT-FREE
(t, n)-QSS
This section presents 2 frameworks of entanglement-
free (t, n)-QSS, which allow any classical (t, n)-SS to be
used to enable the threshold structure. Moreover, several
single quantum system can be applied to the frameworks
and makes QSS schemes to be entanglement free.
Let t, n (t ≤ n) be positive integers, we define that
an entanglement-free (t, n)-QSS is a quantum version of
(t, n)-SS, which divides a secret into n shares and allo-
cates each share to a shareholder such that a minimum t
shareholders are required to recover the secret, while no
entanglement states are involved in the protocol.
A. Basic framework of entanglement-free (t, n)-QSS
An entanglement-free (t, n)-QSS consists of 4 algo-
rithms, classical private Share Distribution SD(s,U), Se-
cret Encoding SE(ϕ, S), Sequential Operation of single
quantum system SO(ϕ0,Um,Ωm, Pm) and Secret Recon-
struction SR(ϕm, Pm).
SD(s,U)-it takes the private value s and the set of n
shareholders U as input and generates Ω, the set of n
shares as output.
SE(ϕ, S)-it provides ϕ0 as output, which is obtained
through encoding the secret S into a given quantum state
ϕ.
SO(ϕ0,Um,Ωm, Pm)-it takes the secret-encoded quan-
tum state ϕ0, the set of m (m ≥ t) participants Um, the
corresponding share set Ωm and the set of m random
numbers Pm as input. After m sequential unitary opera-
tions performed by Um, ϕ0 is mapped into ϕm as output.
SR(ϕm, Pm)-it takes ϕm and the set of m private ran-
dom numbers Pm as input while recovers the secret S to
be output.
To make it clearer, we further explain the entanglement
free (t, n)-QSS framework in details as follow.
classical private Share Distribution SD(s,U) is the
same as share distribution in classical (t, n)-SS. In the
algorithm, a dealer divides the private value s (the secret
in classical (t, n)-SS) into n shares and allocates each
share to a shareholder securely. Note that the private
value s is not the secret S to be shared in our frame-
work. We enforce no constraint at this step, i.e., any
classical (t, n)-SS could be applied to the algorithm.
Secret Encoding SE(ϕ, S)- In this algorithm, the
dealer encodes the secret S into an initial single quan-
tum state ϕ and thus transforms ϕ into a new state ϕ0.
Then, the dealer sends ϕ0 to a group of shareholders
(participants) who would later collaborate to recover the
secret.
Sequential Operation of single quantum system
SO(ϕ0,Um,Ωm, Pm)- In this algorithm, m participants
Um perform sequential unitary operations on the received
ϕ0 to embed their shares in the state. Specifically, on re-
ceiving ϕi−1, 0 ≤ i ≤ m, each participant Ui ∈ Um com-
putes a component ci with its share si ∈ Ωm, embeds
ci and a private random number pi ∈ Pm into ϕi−1 to
generate ϕi by performing some unitary operations. As a
result, ϕ0 is finally transformed into quantum state ϕm.
Note that for a single quantum system, many unitary op-
erations such as phase shift, generalized Pauli operation,
etc., can be utilized here.
Secret reconstruction SR(ϕm, Pm)-In this algorithm,
the last participant Um ∈ Um measures ϕm and pub-
3lishes the measurement result. All participants exchange
private random numbers in Pm and recover the secret S
independently from the measurement result.
Remark 1. As mentioned above, this framework is flex-
ible since all classical (t, n)-SS schemes can be used in
share distribution and multiple unitary operations can
be selected to embed private components into target
state. Moreover, due to the application of single quantum
system, no entanglement is required in the framework.
Therefore, schemes under this framework are more prac-
tical in experiments.
B. Verifiable framework of entanglement-free
(t, n)-QSS
Obviously, if any participant embeds a wrong compo-
nent (e.g.,using the wrong share ) or the quantum system
is eavesdropped in the algorithm of SO(ϕ0,Um,Ωm, Pm),
or the last participant publishes a wrong measurement
result in SR(ϕm, Pm), some participants will recover a
wrong secret. As a matter of fact, the above attacks can
be effectively thwarted by simply adding a verification
quantum state to the framework. The verifiable frame-
work uses k (k ≥ 1) single quantum states to encode k se-
crets. Moreover, it utilizes an extra single quantum state
to encode the verification value, by which each partici-
pant can verify the correctness of the recovered secrets.
As a result, the improved framework is able to detect
cheat attack by participants and eavesdropping attack
by outside adversaries.
The verifiable framework also consists of 4 algo-
rithms, classical private Share Distribution SD(s,U),
Secret Encoding SE({ϕv, Sv|v = 1, 2, ..., k + 1}), Sequen-
tial Operation of single quantum system SO({ϕv0|v =
1, 2, ..., k + 1},Um,Ωm, Pm) and Secret Reconstruction
SR({ϕvm|v = 1, 2, ..., k + 1}, Pm).
The verifiable framework shares the same algorithm of
SD(s, U) with the basic framework.
SE({ϕv, Sv|v = 1, 2, ..., k+ 1})- In this algorithm, the
dealer first encodes k secrets S1, S2, ..., Sk into initial
single quantum states ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕk respectively. Then,
it encodes Sk+1 into the initial single quantum state
ϕk+1 as verification such that Sk+1 = f(S1, S2, ..., Sk)
holds, where f(.) is a verification function. Af-
ter encoding, these initial states are transformed into
ϕ10, ϕ20, ..., ϕ(k+1)0 respectively. Finally, the dealer sends
these states to participants for secret reconstruction.
SO({ϕv0|v = 1, 2, ..., k + 1},Um,Ωm, Pm)- Suppose
there are m participants Um = {U1, U2, ..., Um} want to
recover secrets. The first participant U1 ∈ Um performs
unitary operations on received ϕv0 to embed its compo-
nent c1, generated from share s1 ∈ Ωm and a random
number p1 ∈ Pm, into each state. As a result, ϕv0 is
transformed into quantum states ϕv1. The next partici-
pant U2 ∈ Um repeats the operations as U1 does. Finally,
all states are transformed into ϕvm, v = 1, 2, ..., k + 1 by
the last participant Um.
SR({ϕvm|v = 1, 2, ..., k + 1}, Pm)- In the algorithm,
the last participant Um measures all the quantum states
ϕvm, v = 1, 2, ..., k+1 and publishes measurement results
among Um. All m participants in Um mutually exchange
their private random numbers in Pm. Then each partici-
pant recovers secrets S1, S2, ..., Sk, together with the ver-
ification value Sk+1, independently and checks whether
Sk+1 = f(S1, S2, ..., Sk) holds. If it is true, all secrets are
recovered correctly; otherwise, the recovered results are
discarded.
Remark 2. The verifiable framework uses an extra sin-
gle quantum state to enable verification. As a matter
of fact, only one single quantum state is enough for the
purpose of both encoding and verification.
For a given secret S ∈ GF(q), we first encode it into
the form S′ = S|H(S) ∈ GF(d) as the new secret, where
H(S) is some form of verification value of S, e.g., the one-
way hash value of S or checksum of S in terms of some
type of coding rule; the notation | denotes the opera-
tion of concatenation, d is a prime larger than q. Then,
we employ the basic framework to share the new secret
S′ (suppose that the basic framework shares a secret in
GF(d)). In secret reconstruction, each participant checks
whether the recovered secret has the form of S|H(S), if
it does, the secret S is correctly recovered; otherwise, the
secret is wrong.
Remark 3. In both frameworks, one share is gener-
ated from a single private value s for each participant. If
the single quantum system employs at least two Mutu-
ally Unbiased (orthonormal) Bases as the measurement
bases, a share can be used repeatedly to share multiple
secrets and guarantee the perfectness in security of the
constructed (t, n)-QSS scheme. However, if only using
the computational basis to measure the quantum system
(e.g., in the proposed scheme in section III), in order to
guarantee the above perfectness, k private values are re-
quired to generate k shares for each participant.
In section III, by following the framework, a verifiable
entanglement free (t, n)-QSS scheme is proposed based
on QFT and generalized Pauli operation. The scheme
uses 3 single quantum states to share 2 secrets among
participants and enables each participant to verify the
correctness of recovered secrets.
III. QFT-BASED ENTANGLEMENT FREE
(t, n)-QSS
In this section, we will first introduce 3 basic quan-
tum operations, and then present a concrete QFT based
d-level (t, n)-QSS by following the verifiable framework.
Finally, the correctness of scheme is present.
A. Three quantum operations
We first introduce three useful quantum operations,
i.e., QFT, Inverse QFT and generalized Pauli operation.
4They play important roles in our QSS schemes.
Definition 1 : Quantum Fourier transform is defined
as a linear operator performed on d orthogonal basis
|0〉 , |1〉 , ..., |d− 1〉 in the following way
QFT |j〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ωj·k |k〉 , (1)
where ω = e2pii/d is the dth root of unity.
Definition 2. Inverse Quantum Fourier Transform is
defined as the inverse operator of QFT
QFT−1 |k〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ω−k·j |j〉 , (2)
and it is also a linear operator.
Definition 3. On Hilbert space of a d-level quantum
system, the generalized Pauli operation Um,n is defined
as
Um,n =
d−1∑
k=0
ωn·k |k +m〉 〈k| , (3)
where m,n ∈ GF(d), d is a large prime [35]. With QFT,
the generalized Pauli operation Um,n may complete the
following transformation:
Um,nQFT |j〉 = Um,n 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ωj·k |k〉
=
1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ω(j+n)·k |k +m〉.
(4)
B. QFT based entanglement-free (t, n)-QSS
According to the verifiable framework, the scheme con-
sists of four algorithms, classical private Share Distri-
bution, Secret Encoding, Sequential Operation of single
quantum system and Secret Reconstruction. In the fol-
lowing, we will discuss each phase in details.
classical private Share Distribution. In this algorithm,
the dealer Alice generates and distributes classical pri-
vate shares to n shareholders Bobj, j = 1, 2, ..., n. As
mentioned in Remark 3, Alice generates 3 shares from 3
private values respectively for each shareholder to guar-
antee the security.
(i) Alice picks up 3 random polynomials fv(x), v =
1, 2, 3, of degree at most t − 1 (t ≤ n) over finite
field GF(d):
fv(x) = av0 + av1x+ ...+ av(t−1)x
t−1 mod d, (5)
where sv = av0 = fv(0) denotes the private values,
and all coefficients avj , j = 0, 1, ..., t− 1, are in the
finite field GF(d) for large prime d.
(ii) Alice computes fv(xj) as the shares of shareholder
Bobj for j = 1, 2, ..., n, where xj ∈ GF(d) is the
public information of Bobj with xj 6= xr for j 6= r.
(iii) Alice sends shares fv(xj) to the corresponding
shareholder Bobj through private channel securely.
A shareholder Bobj is also called participant when
he participates in secret reconstruction.
Secret Encoding. Assume that the dealer Alice wants
to share 2 secrets S1, S2 ∈ GF(d) among shareholders. In
order to establish a verifiable (t, n)-QSS, Alice first picks
S3 ∈ GF (d) (verification value) with S1 = S2 · S3 mod d
for public large prime d, and then use single quantum
system to realize the scheme. She first performs QFT on
three standard orthogonal bases |pv0〉 , v = 1, 2, 3, then
for each transformed basis, performs the generalized
Pauli operation U0,qv0 , where Sv = pv0 and qv0 = d− sv.
After that, Alice sends three qudits |Ψv〉0 to participants
for secret reconstruction.
Sequential Operation of single quantum system. To
share the dealer’s secrets S1, S2, arbitrary m (m ≥ t)
participants {Bobj , j = 1, 2, ...,m} should accomplish the
following steps.
(i) To recover the secrets they sequentially complete
their own operations which embed their compo-
nents and random numbers into the quantum
states. Specifically, suppose Bob1 is the first par-
ticipant who receives the three qudits from Al-
ice, he performs the generalized Pauli operations
Upv1,pv1+qv1 on each |Ψv〉0, v = 1, 2, 3, respectively,
where pv1 are mutually independent private random
numbers, qv1 = cv1 = fv(x1)
∏m
r=2
xr
xr−x1 mod d,
and pv1, qv1 ∈ GF(d). As a result, he gets the pro-
cessed states |Ψv〉1. Then Bob1 delivers the states
|Ψv〉1 to Bob2.
(ii) Upon receiving the three qudits, each of the other
participants Bobj, j = 2, 3, ...,m, repeats the same
procedure sequentially as Bob1 does. That is, each
Bobj completes operations Upvj ,pvj+qvj on |Ψv〉j−1
and gets the states |Ψv〉j , where pvj , qvj ∈ GF(d),
pvj are mutually independent random numbers and
qvj = cvj = fv(xj)
∏m
r=1,r 6=j
xr
xr−xj mod d. Subse-
quently, Bobj , j = 2, 3, ...,m− 1 delivers the qudits
|Ψv〉j to the next participant Bobj+1.
Secret Reconstruction. Finally, the last participant
Bobm keeps and performs IQFT on the three qudits for
accurate measurement. Then, all participants can re-
cover the secrets and verify their correctness as follow.
(i) The last participant Bobm chooses the computa-
tional basis {|j〉 , j = 0, 1, ..., d− 1} to measure the
three states |Ψv〉m, v = 1, 2, 3. Then, he publishes
the 3 measurement results R1, R2, R3 to all partic-
ipants.
5(ii) In a valid run, the measurement results Rv, the
dealer’s secrets, pv0 and participants’ private ran-
dom numbers, pvj , j = 1, ...,m satisfy globally
m∑
j=0
pvj = Rv mod d, v = 1, 2, 3. (6)
In this case, to obtain the secrets, all m partic-
ipants need to exchange their random numbers,
such that they can compute the values pv0 = Rv −∑m
j=1 pvj , v = 1, 2, 3.
(iii) To detect cheats and eavesdropping, each partici-
pant verifies whether p10, p20 and p30 satisfy the
following relation
p10 = p20p30 mod d. (7)
If it holds, the secret sharing attempt is not corrupt
and thus the dealer’s secrets S1 = p10, S2 = p20
are successfully shared among all m participants;
otherwise they are aware that this round is invalid
and thus abort it.
Remark 4. Following the above idea, a qudit
with a normalized unknown state |ϕ〉 = ∑d−1j=0 αj |j〉 ,∑d−1
j=0 |αj |2 = 1 can also be shared among at least t share-
holders by substituting the generalized Pauli operation
U0,qj for Upj ,pj+qj .
C. Correctness of the scheme
Now, we show the correctness of the proposed scheme.
The proposed scheme uses 3 qudits |Ψv〉0, v = 1, 2, 3 to
share 2 secrets and 1 verification value. Since all opera-
tions on each qudit are similar, we remove the subscript
v for simplicity, e.g., uniformly use |Ψ〉0 to denote each
qudit |Ψv〉0, v = 1, 2, 3.
With dealer’s operations, qudits are initially prepared
in the state |Ψ〉0 = 1√d
∑d−1
k=0 ω
(p0+q0)·k |k〉. After all m
participants complete their operations sequentially, the
final state becomes
|Ψ〉m =


m∏
j=1
Upj ,pj+qj

 |Ψ〉0
=
ξm√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ω(
∑m
j=0
(pj+qj))·k |k〉
=
ξm√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ω(
∑m
j=0
pj+d−s+
∑m
j=1
cj)·k |k〉
=
ξm√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ω(
∑
m
j=0
pj+L·d)·k |k〉, (L ∈ Z)
(8)
where ξm = ω
−∑ma=1 pa(
∑
a
b=0 (pb+qb)) is an overall phase
term. Since any participant in Shamir’s (t, n)-SS can
recover the secret by summing up all components, i.e.,
s =
m∑
j=1
cj mod d =
m∑
j=1
f(xj)
m∏
r=1,r 6=j
xr
xr − xj mod d.
(9)
Thus we have
∑m
j=1 cj = Nd + s,N ∈ Z to ensure the
correctness of the final state in Equ.(8). Then Bobm
performs IQFT on the qudit, giving
QFT−1|Ψ〉m =
∣∣∣
∑m
j=0
pj mod d
〉
. (10)
So after measuring the state in the computational ba-
sis, Bobm can get the results satisfying Equ.(6). By ex-
changing random numbers, all participants can recover
the secrets from the measurements as shown in Secret
Reconstruction-(ii). Note that, in the last step, we drop
the phase term ξm since a global phase shift does not
affect the (inverse) Fourier components of a given state.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Most classical (t, n)-SS schemes are unconditionally se-
cure. However, almost two decades after the first QSS,
there exists no such a scheme (with or without entan-
glement) which has been proven to be unconditionally
secure against cheating of dishonest players. A recent
work presents a feasible entanglement-based continuous
variable QSS scheme, and derives sufficient conditions for
providing unconditional security of the dealer’s classical
secret against general attacks of an eavesdropper and ar-
bitrary cheating strategies [36]. Furthermore, their re-
sults pave the way for experimental demonstration of an
unconditionally secure QSS.
In this paper, we employ Shamir’s (t, n)-SS to sup-
port the threshold structure and provide information
theoretical security. In Secret Encoding, the dealer Al-
ice adds each secret Sv = pv0, v = 1, 2 to the private
value sv by the generalized Pauli operation U0,qv0 . Af-
ter the last participant Bobm completes his Pauli op-
eration and IQFT, each measurement result is Rv =∑m
j=0 pvj + d− sv +
∑m
j=1 cvj mod d, v = 1, 2, 3.
This process can be considered as an encryption of se-
cret pv0. Obviously, with the published Rv, a partic-
ipant can only reconstruct pv0 after collecting all pri-
vate random numbers pvj , j = 1, 2, ...m and all m com-
ponents cvj correctly. As a result, many attacks does
not work, including intercept-resend attack and entangle-
and-measure attack mounted by an external eavesdrop-
per or participant attack in association with entangle-
ment swapping [29, 37, 38].
In the following, we use Theorem 1 to prove the secu-
rity against collusion attack by less than t participants.
A (t, n)-QSS scheme is perfect with respect to the prob-
ability distribution of secret over secret space if less than
t participants obtains no information about the secret.
Theorem 1. The proposed (t, n)-QSS scheme is perfect
with respect to the probability distribution of secret over
6secret space. That is,
I(Sv; Ω) = H(Sv)−H(Sv|Ω) = 0 (11)
where Ω denotes the set of shares available for less than
t − 1 participants, H(Sv) is the information entropy of
the secret Sv, v = 1, 2 and I(Sv; Ω) represents the mutual
information of Sv with Ω.
Proof. Suppose that m(m ≥ t) participants {Bobj , j =
1, 2, ...,m}, with the corresponding shares {fv(xj), j =
1, 2, ...,m, v = 1, 2}, collaborate to recover each secret
Sv, v = 1, 2 in normal case.
Without losing generality, assume exactly t−1 partici-
pants {Bobj , j = 1, 2, ..., t−1} conspire in the attack and
the participant Bobt−1 measures |Ψv〉t−1 and publishes
the results Rv =
∑t−1
j=0 pvj + d − sv +
∑t−1
j=1 cvj mod d.
After exchanging private random numbers and shares,
{pvj , fv(xj), j = 1, 2, ..., t−1}, each participant, e.g.,Bobj
obtains the following result Rv
′ = pv0 + d− sv mod d.
Since pv0 is uniformly and randomly selected from
GF(d) by Alice from the view of participants, hence,
Sv = pv0 is indistinguishable from a random variable uni-
formly distributed over GF(d), i.e., P (Sv) = 1/d. Con-
sequently, the entropy of Sv is H(Sv) = log d.
According to Shamir’s[1] (t, n)-SS, for m ≥ t, each
private value
sv =
m∑
j=1
fv(xj)
m∏
r=1,r 6=j
xr
xr − xj mod d, (12)
and sv is uniformly distributed over GF(d) if t − 1 par-
ticipants {Bobj , j = 1, 2, ..., t − 1} conspire. That is,
with the shares Ω = {fv(xj), j = 1, 2, ..., t− 1} available,
they have the probability P (sv|Ω) = 1/d to obtain sv,
i.e., P (Sv|Ω) = 1/d due to Rv ′ = pv0 + d − sv mod d
and Sv = pv0. As a result, we have conditional entropy
H(Sv|Ω) = log d.
Therefore, we finally have
I(Sv; Ω) = H(Sv)−H(Sv|Ω) = 0. (13)
Since both secrets Sv, v = 1, 2 and the verification
value S3 all satisfy the above equation, the proposed
scheme is perfect with respect to probability distribution
of secrets in the secret space GF(d).
To free from the trusted third party, the last partic-
ipant is appointed to measure the qudit and thus, he
directly knows the measurement results(i.e., the summa-
tions of each secret and random numbers). By publish-
ing fake measurement results, the last participant itself
recovers true secrets while causes others to obtain wrong
secrets. Of course, other participant can also cheat by us-
ing a wrong share in secret reconstruction. Moreover, the
qudits are obviously vulnerable to eavesdropping. Thus
the proposed scheme establishes a verification mechanism
to detect such cheat or eavesdropping.
Let consider the error rate of verification mechanism,
i.e., the probability that the verification mechanism does
not detect wrong secrets. The ideal error rate is certainly
0 since it means all false secrets can be detected during
secret reconstruction.
Theorem 2. In the proposed scheme, the error rate of
verification mechanism converges to 0 when the size of
secret space approaches to infinity. That is,
lim
d→∞
re = 0, (14)
where re denotes the error rate and d represents the size
of secret space.
Proof. For correct measurement results Rv and the cor-
responding sums of random numbers of all participants,
Nv =
∑m
j=1 pvj , v = 1, 2, 3, assume that the last partic-
ipant Bobm publishes the wrong measurements Rv
′ 6=
Rv, v = 1, 2, 3. Obviously, if (R1
′ − N1) = (R2′ −
N2)(R3
′ − N3) mod d happens to hold, the wrong mea-
surement results cannot be detected. In this case, the
verification mechanism fails and thus the other partici-
pants recover wrong secrets without being detected.
Obviously, if Bobm randomly and uniformly chooses
3 values R1
′, R2′ and R3′ in GF(d) as measurement re-
sults and publishes them to the other participants, there
are totally d3 tuples of {R1′, R2′, R3′}. Note that Rv, v =
1, 2, 3 are published before all participants exchange their
random values pvj , j = 1, 2, ...,m to obtain the sums Nv.
Since each participant Bobj picks his random values pvj
privately and independently, Nv =
∑m
j=1 pvj , are indis-
tinguishable from random numbers uniformly distributed
in GF(d) in the view of all participants. As a result,
(Rv
′ −Nv) are also indistinguishable from random num-
bers uniformly distributed in GF(d) for participants. In
this case, there are totally d2 randomly selected tuples of
{R1′, R2′, R3′} satisfying
(R1
′ −N1) = (R2′ −N2)(R3′ −N3) mod d, (15)
because, given {N1, N2, N3}, R3′ can always be deter-
mined for randomly selected pairs of {R1′, R2′}.
The result is the same if any other participant, i.e.,
Bobj,= 1, 2, ...,m − 1 cheats by releasing any different
random number p′vj 6= pvj , v = 1, 2, 3 when exchanging
random numbers.
Therefore, the error rate of the verification mechanism
is re = d
2/d3 = 1/d. Similarly, if we use k + 1 qudits to
share k, (k > 2) secrets in GF(d), the error rate remains
to be re = d
k/dk+1 = 1/d. Therefore,
lim
d→∞
re = lim
d→∞
dk
dk+1
= lim
d→∞
1
d
= 0. (16)
That is, the error rate converges to 0 when d approaches
to infinity.
In conclusion, the scheme can detect the cheat by par-
ticipant with the probability (d − 1)/d, which converges
to 100% if d is larger enough.
7V. RELATED WORK AND COMPARISONS
Since the proposal of the first QSS [14], various ex-
tension schemes have been proposed in last two decades.
Many of them are based on entanglement states (HBB-
type). Due to the high cost of engineering multiparti-
cle entanglement states, efforts have been made for more
economical HBB-type QSS through reducing the num-
ber of required particles [39, 40]. In a work [41], the
authors further generalize HBB-type QSS to d-level plat-
form by utilizing multiparticle (> 3) entanglement GHZ
states. An interesting entanglement-based QSS using en-
tangled state as the secure carriers and splitters of in-
formation has been studied in [42]. However, all those
schemes are poor in scalability with growing participants
and may easily render an invalid run because a partic-
ipant may fail in measurement due to inefficient detec-
tion. Different from entanglement-based HBB-type QSS,
some entanglement-free schemes [26–28] have also been
proposed. But these schemes will be of less interest for
secret sharing due to some drawbacks, e.g. they are all
(n, n) structures which are not flexible under different
applications and they offer no unconditional security.
As for schemes with (t, n) structure, the first one was
proposed in 1999 [13]. It shows that the only con-
straint on the existence of (t, n) threshold schemes comes
from quantum no-cloning theorem, which requires n <
2t. Moreover, the paper gives efficient constructions of
threshold schemes which divides a secret quantum state
into n shares, such that any t or more than t partici-
pants can recover the initial state using linear transfor-
mation. However, mapping a quantum state to n quan-
tum states by coding is difficult and the scheme is not
easy to extend when the mapping rules are determined.
Later, some other schemes with general (t, n) threshold
structure were proposed. Among these schemes, those in
[43–45] benefit from continuous variable and thus, they
are easier to implement in practical experiments. Oth-
ers employ graph states, which provide a superb resource
for secret sharing, to construct QSS schemes [45–47]. Re-
cently, a new method was developed by taking advantage
of the ability of exactly distinguishing orthogonal multi-
partite entangled states under restricted local operation
and classical communication [48–50].
Unlike those utilizing special quantum systems, some
other threshold QSS schemes are proposed, in which the
threshold structures are supported by a classical (t, n)-
SS. For example, the schemes in [51, 52] employ Shamir’s
(t, n)-SS in the field of F2N and some unitary operations
to encode classical bit strings. After that, phase shift op-
eration is used to embed private values in classical secret
sharing (e.g., shares in Shamir’s (t, n)-SS or elements in
linear equation) into quantum states, and secrets can be
retrieved by recovering the quantum states [53, 54]. Re-
cently, a (t, n) QSS scheme in d-dimension supported by
QFT and Shamir’s (t, n)-SS was proposed [55]. Generally
speaking, a d-level QSS is more universal and practical
than 2-level ones. But in such a scheme, a trusted third
party (e.g., the dealer) is required to measure the quan-
tum states in secret reconstruction and, as HBB-type
ones, it is not scalable either.
Compared with these (t, n) schemes, our scheme only
employs sequential d-level unitary operations in associ-
ation with classical (t, n) threshold secret sharing on a
single qudit. Besides, the scheme use 3 values in GF(d)
to share 2 secrets in the same range. If we define the
information rate of coding as the ratio of the length of
secret to that of code carrying the secret. therefore, the
information rate of coding is 2/3. In general case, the
scheme uses k+1 values (embedded into k+1 qudits) to
share k secrets. Therefore, the information rate of coding
is k/k+1 and thus converges to 1 when k approaches to
infinity. Moreover, our scheme also shows great scalabil-
ity and possesses strict threshold structure. Furthermore,
benefiting from the verification mechanism, the proposed
(t, n)-QSS scheme doesn’t require any trusted third party
responsible for measurement results, and any cheat by a
participant or eavesdropping can be detected.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work proposes a verifiable framework for thresh-
old QSS without entanglement. Such a scheme allows
to incorporate any single quantum system to enable
QSS without entanglement and utilize existing classical
(t, n)-SS to keep (t, n)-threshold structure. Besides,
a verification mechanism is established for thwarting
cheat and eavesdropping attacks. As an example, we
demonstrate a concrete (t, n)-QSS scheme using QFT
and generalized Pauli operation. It shares k secrets and
an extra verification value with sequential applications
of generalized Pauli operation. At last, each participant
can independently recovers secrets and verifies the
correctness from measurement results. We further prove
that the proposed scheme is perfectly secure and the
verification mechanism is sufficient since the error rate
converges to 0 if the size of secret space approaches
infinity. Thus, this class of entanglement-free (t, n)-QSS
schemes constructed under our framework can address
the drawbacks in previous entanglement-free QSS and
will be more useful in quantum communication networks
due to their intrinsic scalability, flexibility and perfect
security.
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